Despite sincere attempts to interpret Evangelium vitae and the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops' (USCCB) Ethical and Religious Directives (ERDs) of Catholic Health Care on direct versus indirect abortion, Catholic moral theologians docile to the magisterium and to Pope John Paul II's teaching remain divided on how the ERDs should be interpreted based on the meaning of the word "direct." The traditional natural law theory holds that the moral object in an indirect abortion involves not only that the abortion is unintended by the subject but also indirectly caused. The second and more novel interpretation referred to as the New Natural Law (NNL) theory is that an indirect abortion refers only to abortions which the acting person does not intend, whether or not he immediately causes them. Because the novel view bases its entire revision of the moral object by considering only "the perspective of the acting person", a key text in Veritatis splendor no. 78, they argue that they are being faithful to Pope John Paul II's teaching in Veritatis splendor (VS) no. 78. In this article I argue that their reasoning is based on a fundamental misreading of Veritatis splendor and that the Pope himself would reject their view, even though they quote him, because their interpretation contradicts the fundamental moral principles that Pope John Paul II himself lays out within the very same chapter of Veritatis splendor. Furthermore, when the foundations of the broader NNL theory are brought to light, it becomes clear that the fundamental mistake at the root of this disputed question is that the NNL theory interprets the magisterial documents of Pope John Paul II through their own philosophical method-a method of moral analysis not shared by Pope John Paul II or the magisterium. When this interpretive error is brought to light, and Pope John Paul II is read on his own terms, it is clear that a direct abortion involves any attack on the unborn child that the acting person immediately and physically causes.
Keywords
Abortion, Bioethics, Difficult moral questions, Ectopic pregnancy, High-risk pregnancy, Moral object, Veritatis splendor Two of the most important ethical and religious directives (ERDs) concerning direct or indirect abortions are ERDs 45 and 47. In these directives, the US Conference of Catholic Bishops has distinguished the evil of direct abortion versus the licit albeit tragic situation in which a procedure or medication aimed at treating a proportionately serious pathological condition results secondarily in the death of an unborn child, following the principle of double effect. While the ethical principles from these directives seem clear on the surface, nevertheless, Catholic moral theologians who are docile to the magisterium and to Pope John Paul II's moral teaching are, in fact, divided in how these directives should be interpreted. The first interpretation is the traditional natural law (TNL) theory which holds that the moral object in an indirect abortion involves not only that the abortion is unintended by the subject but also indirectly caused (Long 2008; Long 2013; Jensen 2014; Austriaco 2011; O'Brien and Koons 2012; Berg 2017; Haas 2017) . The second and more novel interpretation referred to as the New Natural Law (NNL) theory is that a direct abortion refers only to abortions which the acting person does not intend, whether or not he immediately causes them (Finnis et al. 2001; Tollefsen 2006; Rhonheimer 2009; Brugger 2013; May 2013) . Since both sets of theologians consider themselves to be faithfully interpreting the Catholic moral tradition and the magisterial documents of Pope John Paul II, yet give opposing judgments, this situation presents a great difficulty for medical professionals and ethics committees who need to make decisions in concrete scenarios with the confidence that they are following sound moral reasoning and the ERDs for Catholic health care.
The Linacre Quarterly recently published Dr. John Haas's (2017) article, "Moral Theological Analysis of Direct versus Indirect Abortion." Against the position of Fr. Martin Rhonheimer, Haas (2017) argues that the criteria for a "direct" abortion cannot be simply what is intended by the acting person but includes an action which is "an unmediated death-dealing action taken against an innocent unborn child" (p. 251). In Haas's view, Rhonheimer's analysis of abortions in vital conflict situations is incorrect on two counts: first, Rhonheimer (2009) argues that it is immoral to abstain from acting in a conflict situation if at least one of the two persons can be saved (p. 19) . Second, Rhonheimer argues that in a conflict situation, the moral object changes due to the intentionality of the acting person. In Rhonheimer's view, in a conflict case, the pregnant mother and physician do not intentionally desire to destroy a human life. The act that physically and in an unmediated way causes death is not a part of what the moral agent chooses from his perspective. To the first of Rhonheimer's theses, Haas successfully makes the case that Rhonheimer's argumentation falls outside of Catholic moral reasoning because what the "life-saving intervention" involves is pertinent to what the moral agent deliberately chooses. The Church has never argued that the end justifies the means when situations become dire nor that moral reasoning is determined by judging what the better outcome would be: at least one patient alive over two dead. Haas demonstrates that the idea of trying simply to "save the life that we can save" undermines the principles of sound moral reasoning.
To the second of Rhonheimer's theses, Haas (2017) argues that "no moral norm can possibly stay on the purely intentional level. Ethics deals with the deliberate chosen actions in space and time of embodied human beings; it deals inescapably with material actions" (p. 255). Haas (2017) finds that Rhonheimer's reading of direct abortion in Evangelium vitae as "an intentional action without reliance on physical categories" simply cannot be a sound interpretation of the encyclical (p. 254).
While I agree with Dr. Haas's conclusions about the nature of a direct versus "indirect" abortion as rooted in the unmediated character of the death dealing action, and his criticism of Rhonheimer's position on both counts, one key issue that Haas does not address or even mention in his article is that the very language of viewing human acts "from the perspective of the acting person" and of the moral object not being reducible to what is "merely physical" comes from Pope John Paul II himself in Veritatis splendor (VS) no. 78. This magisterial language, then, lends considerable weight to the opinion not only of Rhonheimer but also to highly esteemed and orthodox Catholic moral theologians such as Germain Grisez and William May, Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle (2001) precisely because he considers himself to be a faithful disciple of Pope John Paul II in VS. In fact, May updated and reinterpreted his entire book, Catholic Bioethics and the Gift of Human Life in the third edition with the help of E. Christian Brugger, to reflect his new mode of reasoning about the moral object through "the perspective of the acting person." May rethought his whole approach to bioethics precisely because of what he found in VS.
While Haas (2017) argues that the direct/indirect distinction may need to be addressed explicitly by magisterial intervention before the NNL analysis of the moral object is put into practice more regularly in Catholic health care (p. 259)-and indeed, it may come to that-I believe that there is a much simpler (and faster) solution. It is necessary to bring to light two specific things: (1) the underlying theoretical difference between the TNL and NNL theories on specifying a moral object in the class of intrinsically evil actions. My contention is that those involved in this debate about direct and indirect abortions may not be adequately aware of the specific theoretical differences and how they affect each theory's definition of a moral species. (2) The entire revision of the moral object only through the "perspective of the acting person" is a fundamentally unsound interpretation of Pope John Paul II's words in VS no. 78 and one that the Pope himself would reject precisely because it contradicts the fundamental moral principles that Pope John Paul II himself lays out within the very same chapter of VS-principles that characterize the Catholic moral tradition. Furthermore, when the foundations of the broader NNL theory are brought to light-namely that it defines moral acts by the interior choices of the acting person, not by the natural structure of human acts-it becomes abundantly clear that the fundamental mistake in this whole discussion is that the NNL theory interprets magisterial documents through their own distinct philosophical method, a method of moral analysis that is not shared by Pope John Paul II nor shared by the magisterium of the Church. Just as it would be a mistake to read Aristotle, not on his own terms, but through the lens of David Hume, so also in an analogous way, do the NNL thinkers misread the teaching of Pope John Paul II, by applying their own unique method to the text, and therefore arrive at very radical conclusions.
In this article, I will demonstrate that the TNL interpretation held by Haas, Long, Austriaco, Jensen, and others is not only the correct teaching but also that the novel teaching, despite its sincere attempt to maintain orthodoxy to ecclesial statements, nevertheless represents a radical and decisive departure from the Catholic moral tradition. To this end, I will first (1) illustrate the ambiguity in the ethical directives on direct abortion, (2) explain the root of the difference between the two approaches in their interpretation of Pope John Paul's VS, and finally (3) demonstrate that the traditional approach is the only one consistent with both present and prior magisterial teaching on the foundations for moral reasoning in medical ethics.
ERDs 45 and 47: A Need for Clarification
In order to illustrate the differences more clearly, it is necessary to examine the main ERDs on direct abortion. I have highlighted in italics the phrases which are a source of confusion.
Abortion (that is, the directly intended termination of pregnancy before viability or the directly intended destruction of a viable fetus) is never permitted. Every procedure whose sole immediate effect is the termination of pregnancy before viability is an abortion, which in its moral context, includes the interval between conception and implantation of the embryo. Catholic health care institutions are not to provide abortion services, even based upon the principle of material cooperation. In this context, Catholic health care institutions need to be concerned about the danger of scandal in any association with abortion providers. (The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops [USCCB] 2018, no. 45) Operations, treatments, and medications that have as their direct purpose the cure of a proportionately serious pathological condition of a pregnant woman are permitted when they cannot be safely postponed until the unborn child is viable, even if they will result in the death of the unborn child. (USCCB 2018, no. 47) The point of departure between the TNL and NNL on this specific issue concerns how each theory conceives of the meaning of the word direct. Does it imply only the intentionality of the subject or also an immediate causal relation? The novel view emphasizes that direct abortion is the "directly intended termination of a pregnancy" according to ERD 45. The traditional view agrees that direct abortions are intended, or perhaps better put, deliberately chosen, and that indirect abortions must necessarily be unintended but goes on to emphasize that a direct abortion is also one in which "the sole immediate effect is the termination of pregnancy" according to ERD 45. The novel view, on the other hand, restricts its judgment only to the intentionality of the subject performing the action in describing the moral object, whereas the latter concludes that not only the subject's intentionality but also his immediate causality informs the species of the action. Thus, the difference between these two theories at the tip of the iceberg concerns the question of whether or not what one physically and immediately causes should enter the moral object. Brugger (2013) argues, for example, that human actions can be immediately and "physically caused, but morally unintended," whereas Austriaco (2011) , argues that the moral object specified by the acting person, "if he is to remain reasonable and intelligible, is limited by the physical structure of those acts." (509) Thus, the disagreement on what is licit in situations of conflict continues.
What is not commonly understood about this issue, however, is that the divide underneath the surface of these two theories is significantly greater. I firmly believe that the only way to make true progress on this issue is to bring to light each side's prior theoretical commitments. It is necessary first to take one step back in order to move forward with greater clarity. The fundamental divide beneath the surface is that the TNL view considers that the order of nature is normative for ethics since it is from natural teleology that one can have knowledge of the natural structure of human acts. The founders of the NNL theory, however, quite openly and explicitly reject this view. They argue instead that moral objects are defined by the subject's own intelligence and interior choice. Thus, the difference in judgment on the issue of direct versus indirect abortion does not consist at a level of mere intuition about what one ought to do in a particular conflict case-an intuition that might vary among ethics committees or medical personnel-but proceeds, for both theories, as logical and practical conclusions from two sets of prior theoretical commitments. I will illustrate briefly the vast difference in moral analysis between these two theories through the example of contraception. Both the TNL and NNL agree that contraception is morally evil, but the rationale in each theory is completely different; the former discovers moral norms primarily from the natural structure of human acts, whereas the latter defines moral objects by the interior choices of the acting person. My contention is that those involved in this debate about direct and indirect abortions may not be adequately aware of the underlying theoretical difference and how it affects each theory's definition of a moral species.
In an early article in the Thomist, "A New Formulation of a Natural Law Argument against Contraception," Germain Grisez demonstrates his "new" method of moral analysis. He distinguishes between an "action with a given structure" and "acts structured by intelligence." "The natural given structure of the sexual act"-that is a phrase one often encounters in discussions of contraception. The contention here is that there is no such thing, if we are talking about the human act; for human acts have their structure from intelligence. Just insofar as an action is considered according to its natural given structure, it is to that extent not considered as a human acti.e. as a moral act-but rather as a physiological process or as instinctive behaviour. Action with a given structure and acts structured by intelligence differ totally as nature differs from morality. Nature has an order which reason can consider but cannot make and cannot alter. Morality has an order which reason institutes by guiding the acts of the will. (Grisez 1966, 343, emphasis added) Grisez states here that moral analysis does not proceed by examining the natural structure of a human act, but solely from the agent's own "intelligence," or what he later calls an "intelligible proposal." For Grisez, to the extent that one speaks of the natural structures of such acts, one not yet speaking about a moral act. It is the mind's proposal or interior choice that makes a certain physical act to be moral or immoral. One of the reasons that Grisez comes to this conclusion is due to how he describes what nature is. Notice how he characterizes it as "a physiological process or as instinctive behaviour." This description represents the physicalist objection to the natural law and Grisez would be right to condemn such as view, as does Pope John Paul II in VS no. 47. But Pope John Paul II very adeptly recognized that a common error among intellectuals of his time is that they have a habit of reducing the "order of nature" to merely the "biological order." In his early philosophical work, Love and Responsibility, Wojtyla (1993) explains,
The expressions "the order of nature" and "the biological order" must not be confused or regarded as identical, the 'biological order' does indeed mean the same as the order of nature but only insofar as this is accessible to the methods of empirical and descriptive natural science, and not as a specific order of existence with an obvious relationship to the Frist Cause, to God the Creator.
This habit of confusing the order of existence with the biological order, or rather of allowing the second to obscure the first, is part of that generalized empiricism which seems to weigh so heavily on the mind of modern man, and particularly on modern intellectuals, and makes it particularly difficult for them to understand the principles on which Catholic sexual morality is based. (p. 57)
Grisez here shows himself to be precisely one of these intellectuals who rejects the underlying principle (not the conclusions) for Catholic sexual morality precisely because he conceives of nature as merely "physiological" and "instinctive" and hence it cannot be the locus for morality. For this reason, he then locates the foundation for morality not in "nature," as he understands it, but within man's "inner self" as he explains: "It is possible to make a choice and then not act on it. Hence morality, which is centered in choice, is not so much in one's behaviour as in one's inner self . . . Having chosen, one usually proceeds to do what was chosen. The outward performance shares in and completes the goodness or badness of the choice" (Grisez 1983, 50, emphasis added) . It is true that persons sometimes make a decision in their heart to do evil and then later decide against it; but one must carefully consider how Grisez is speaking of the morality of a human act. On his account, the locus of morality is in the "inner self" and "not so much in one's behavior" or "outward performance"; the external act or behavior is only "sharing in" the prior choice that already took place within the mind and will of the actor.
The shift in how Grisez understands a moral act is considerable, when compared with the ecclesial method, in its consideration of intrinsically evil acts specifically, acts which are deemed wrong "by nature." Whereas Grisez locates moral or immoral behavior in the interior choice, and the exterior act only "completes the goodness or badness of the choice," the Church repeatedly defines intrinsically evil acts according to the human act in its natural structure, that is, precisely in a certain type of "behavior" and not by what is purely interior to the agent prior to the performance of the behavior. At root, there are two very distinct methods of analyzing a moral act, as become clear in the analysis of contraception. For example, Finnis, Grisez, Boyle, and May argue that "Contraception can be defined only in terms of the beliefs, intentions, and choices that render behaviour contraceptive" (Finnis et al. 1998, 41) . Thus, they conclude that the real evil of contraception consists in a "contralife will" rather than what the Church has consistently taught, namely, that it is wrong to pervert the natural faculty. For example, the natural faculty argument is present in Casti connubi's (CC) (Pope Pius XI 1930) condemnation of contraception in 1930: "Since, therefore, the conjugal act is destined primarily by nature for the begetting of children, those who in exercising it deliberately frustrate its natural power and purpose sin against nature and commit a deed which is shameful and intrinsically vicious" (no. 54). The 1968 encyclical Humanae vitae (HV), while adding a significantly more personalist approach in the early part of the document in comparison with CC, nevertheless also insists that a contraceptive act remains intrinsically evil because: "the reason is that the fundamental nature of the marriage act, while uniting husband and wife in the closest intimacy, also renders them capable of generating new lifeand this as a result of laws written into the actual nature of man and of woman" (HV, no. 11, emphasis added). The way that the Church proceeds in analyzing intrinsically evil acts comes from understanding actions within their natural structure and telos, and not from first looking to the pure interior movement of the will and what it projects onto behavior or the external act in question. An even closer look at Humanae vitae makes this point all the more clear. In no. 16, Pope Paul VI compares two couples who both for serious reasons wish to postpone conception; one freely makes recourse to infertile periods and the other freely uses contraception. He states, "In reality, these two cases are completely different. In the former the married couple rightly use a faculty provided them by nature. In the later they obstruct the natural development of the generative process.
It cannot be denied that in each case the married couple, for acceptable reasons, are both perfectly clear in their intention to avoid children and wish to make sure that none will result." (HV, no. 16, emphasis added) . This moral evaluation is stunning. Even though both couples sincerely and explicitly wish to avoid children, making "sure that none will result" the definitive moral difference between the two cases is that the NFP practicing couple does nothing to interrupt the agency of conjugal union towards procreation, whereas the contracepting couple does. The latter "obstructs the natural development of the generative process" which is another way of saying that either in anticipation of conjugal union, during, or afterwards, this couple has done something to impede the natural agency of sex towards the finality of procreation. According to HV, the critical moral factor actually has nothing to do with the intention of the couple at all, since both are "perfectly clear" in their desire to postpone a new conception. The decisive criteria is maintaining the natural structure of the conjugal act. The NFP couple does just that, whereas the contracepting couple obstructs the agency of that act. The physical act of using a condom or the birth control pill does obstruct the very nature of conjugal union towards procreation. The moral problem is not the mere physicality of a condom or pill, but what that freely chosen physicality actually does to the order of God's design. Therefore the argument in Humanae vitae is not one based on merely physiological reasoning at all; rather it is deeply rooted within the teleology of the order of nature, and man's moral obligation to conform himself to nature. Let's return briefly to Grisez's words that I cited above specifically in reference to contraception. Grisez states, "Just insofar as an action is considered according to its natural given structure, it is to that extent not considered as a human act -i.e. as a moral act." But this assertion is simply false according to the ecclesial teaching! In the name of defending the Catholic tradition, Grisez actually teaches the complete opposite of what the Catholic tradition really holds: that the natural structure of a freely chosen act makes a decisive moral difference. Grisez's departure from the ecclesial rationale, then, is actually quite radical. Is so radical that Janet Smith (1991) explicitly states that, "Grisez denies that reason must conform itself to nature" (p. 353). Grisez speaks instead of the order of morality as something that reason "institutes" by way of interior choices, rather than of reason conforming itself to the order of nature. Because Grisez erroneously holds that all arguments from nature are merely physiological, he decided to reinvent the underlying grounds for moral reasoning. Janet Smith summarizes the difference as follows:
In brief, they [Grisez et al.] understand contraception to be a[n interior] choice that defines one's act, whereas the tradition considers contraception to be an act that defines one's will. They understand contraception to be a choice that ought never to be made, the tradition understands it to be an act that ought never to be chosen.
Grisez and his colleagues seem to think that it is the choice that defines the act, not the act that defines the will. (p. 355, emphasis mine).
The difference here is not semantics; it is a profound philosophical difference at the foundation and at root proceeds from a confusion and conflation of the "order of nature" with the "biological order"-an error which Pope John Paul II himself was acutely aware of and took the time to renounce explicitly in both papal and prepapal works. On account of this fact, the NNL theory shifts the entire foundation for morality from the natural structure of an act (because nature is understood as merely "physiological") to solely the interiority of the acting person. The NNL theory then openly and explicitly rejects the traditional view of discovering moral norms from nature and the obligation for reason to conform itself to nature. Rather, the NNL theory locates moral reasoning solely in the "intelligence" and inner "choice" of the acting subject being projected onto the external act and only allows what the subject intends about the basic good in question to enter the moral object. Yet the Church never defines intrinsically evil actions in this manner! Rather she maintains that there is a moral meaning already inscribed into the order of nature, and the free and deliberate choice to perform certain external behaviors does contradict the order of God's design.
The ultimate reason why Grisez rejects the intelligibility of nature as a foundation for moral reasoning is because he accepts David Hume's critique that an "ought" or a moral norm cannot be derived from an "is." He accepts Hume's understanding of nature, not as a wise ordering of causes revealing an inherent intelligibility as is characteristic of the scholastic view but merely what is "physiological or instinctive behavior." While I do not intend to demonstrate here why scholastic teaching on natural teleology is not in any way susceptible to Hume's critique, since it has been sufficiently demonstrated elsewhere (Feser 2015, 387) , it remains critical to see, however, that Grisez's method of moral analysis is a fundamental departure from the ecclesial method and that he is aware that he is departing from it. Whereas the Church's reasoning on intrinsically evil acts comes from the natural structure of the act itself, Grisez locates the evil only in the will of the acting person, in his interior choice, quite apart from the design in human nature with its inherent teleological structure. Grisez, persuaded by Hume's critique, explicitly rejects natural teleology as the ground for moral reasoning and hence rejects the natural structure of acts as a foundation for specifying a moral object. He states his position very explicitly and openly, "it is futile to argue that any act is right or wrong by appealing to its naturally given structure" (Grisez 1966, 343 ). Yet in insisting that a moral argument derived from the natural structure of an action is a "futile" argument, Grisez consciously departs from the way in which the Church herself articulates why intrinsically evil acts are wrong in the first place. As noted above, such arguments would be futile if they proceeded purely on a physiological basis as Grisez thinks they do; but Grisez here is conflating the order of nature with the biological order and in the words of Pope John Paul II (Wojtyla), such an error "makes it particularly difficult" for such intellectuals to accept the basis of the ecclesial teaching-so much so in fact, that Grisez found it necessary to reinvent the reason for why contraception is evil. Scholars involved in the direct abortion debate simply must come to terms with Grisez's prior theoretical commitments and understand that his method of specifying a moral object differs at the foundation from the magisterial tradition. It is a fact that he himself openly admits.
As Smith (1991) insightfully states-and it cannot be emphasized enough-"their [NNL] analysis, especially in its terminology, in many ways resembles traditional modes of analysis; these resemblances can mislead the reader into thinking that their analysis is more aligned within the tradition than, in fact it is" (p. 353, emphasis mine). The NNL theory is a new innovation which needs to be judged on its own merits; but we must be clear that it is not aligned with the tradition either on the foundation for its theory nor in its rationale for why intrinsically evil actions are immoral. Although there are many moral issues in which the NNL theory and the Church's teaching share the same conclusions about what is good or evil, readers tend to see these conclusions and believe that the rationale is the same; it is not. Grisez, of course, certainly understood himself to be sincerely defending the ecclesial teaching, even as he was explicitly aware that his own arguments were, in his own words, "A New Formulation." I believe that this key theoretical difference is at the heart of the contemporary dispute about direct and indirect abortion.
Before demonstrating the divergence in views as it applies to an abortion conflict case, I would like to be absolutely clear about my argument here by anticipating a possible objection. Is it not true that sometimes a moral object can be specified as good or evil solely by the intention? Do we not distinguish boxing from battery in this fashion? Or to take up a medical example, cannot certain acts in their natural structure such as removing a patient from the ventilator in some cases be licit when judged to be an extraordinary means, but in other cases immoral on the grounds that a physician or family intends the death of a patient? The answer is yes and no in different respects. It is true that a malicious intent can specify a moral object, but two important points must be kept in mind: first even in these cases, the moral object specified remains rooted in the natural structure of the external act, and never solely in the interior choice (what is boxing or battery without the external behavior of beating up another?), and second, acts involving a further specification in this manner do not belong to the class of actions of which I am speaking here-acts intrinsically evil by nature. I am not attempting to explain all the principles of moral theology; the argument I am presenting concerns more narrowly only a certain class of actions which are intrinsically immoral. Let us now consider a contemporary vital conflict example.
Case Study
A woman pregnant with twins at twenty weeks gestation seeks emergency treatment for a ruptured amniotic sack. The doctors immediately admit her and put her on bed rest. They determine that the low and leaking amniotic fluid poses a high risk of mortality for both twins and that the best prognosis is to attempt to save at least one of the babies. The physician recommends a "fetal reduction," the termination of one twin which would enable the woman's womb to make more room for the health and growth of the other. In the current in utero conditions, it is very unlikely that both of the twins will survive to viability.
A traditional analysis would judge the physician's suggested action as a direct abortion of a baby. The medical procedure involves the physician deliberately choosing to inject potassium chloride into the heart of one of the babies thus causing his immediate death. For the TNL thinkers, it is a very clear case of deliberately choosing a direct abortion in order to save the other twin-a noble intention but nevertheless a morally evil deed. It is evil because the natural structure of the act itself is an immediate death dealing action upon an innocent human person; it is intrinsically evil. The interior choice of the mother or physician does not define the outward behavior; rather, it is an external behavior or act that ought never to be chosen.
The novel theory would interpret the facts of the case very differently and likely judge that the abortion is indirect and therefore licit. I will employ their method of analysis to this case. Here, I will take up Grisez's and May's analysis, rather than Rhonheimer's. Grisez, unlike Rhonheimer, does not argue that it is unjust to abstain from acting if some procedure could be chosen; but like Rhonheimer, he does argue that a first person description provides a more adequate analysis of the moral object than one given by "observers." According to Grisez, What counts for moral analysis is not what may or may not be included in various descriptions that might be given by observers . . . but what is or is not included within a proposal developed in deliberation for possible adoption by choice. Only the truthful articulation of that proposal can be a description that specifies an act for the purposes of moral analysis. (Grisez et al. 2001, 29) For Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle and their followers (Tollefsen 2006; Brugger 2013; May 2013) , the moral object is specified "only" by the agent's proposal in the action, that is, what he sees and understands himself to be doing. The reason is that on their view, as demonstrated above, morality originates solely from the interior choice, which is then projected onto the external behavior in question. The physical action in its integral nature, namely delivering a lethal injection to stop a beating heart, does not enter the moral object because on their view, the nature of the action is merely physical and is not included within the proposal that the acting person adopts in his mind, which defines his choice. On their view, the physician does not "directly intend the termination of a pregnancy" as defined by ERD 45. Rather, the kind of proposal that the doctor adopts as his choice is merely the puncturing of the uterus to reduce the size of one baby in order to decrease the stress to the other and to save his or her life.
1 The doctor does not formally intend "killing" as a part of his proposal or interior choice. To paraphrase Joseph Boyle's words as they apply to this case: it is not the killing which removes the threat but changing the dimensions of the baby's body (i.e., his eventual shriveling up after the injection, thereby providing more viable space in the womb) that actually facilitates a better prognosis for the other twin. It is the dimensions of the baby being altered, not its death, which saves the other twin's life (Grisez et al. 2001; May 2013) .
2 Just as in the craniotomy procedure in a situation of maternal-fetal vital conflict, the physical act of crushing the skull of the infant is chosen, so that the child can get through the birth canal, and not because one desires to kill the child, so also in this case is the physical act of delivering a lethal injection chosen only to "alter dimensions," to provide more viable space, so that the other twin's life will be rescued from an almost certain death. In both cases, on the NNL view, the interior choice to "alter dimensions" when one knows that such an act is an immediately deathdealing act remains licit. On the NNL view, this conflict case is fundamentally different from a woman pregnant with multiples who deliberately wishes to "reduce to a singlet" because she only wants one baby and cannot afford more. Such an action would be a direct abortion on the NNL view because the killing is intentional. But in the conflict case described above, there may be no "intentional killing." Therefore, the baby's death on their view is "indirect" because it is genuinely unintended and thus a "side effect" of the real interior choice to merely reduce the size of the child to save the other's life. After all, neither the parents nor the doctor wants to kill the baby. If they did, it would be murder, but since they do not, it is not murder. Murder is only defined by the inner choice to murder projected onto and completed by the external act. In the conflict case, the baby's death itself is not any part of their own proposal. A sign that their proposal is truthful is that if both twins could be saved in another way, they would certainly choose that option, but the physician judges in this case that there is no other way. Therefore, since the death of the baby is not a part of the physician's "intelligible proposal" that moves him to act, the baby's death is an unintended "side effect." Death is neither the end sought nor the means chosen, as the physician has described it. Thus, the termination of one of the twins via a potassium chloride injection given directly into his or her heart may be-according to their theory-a morally justifiable "indirect" killing, because the intent is to affect the uterine conditions to render them more suitable, not to kill the child.
The logical conclusion of this moral theory is that in situations of true vital conflict, either interfetal or maternal-fetal, it may remain licit to perform on a living unborn child a dilation and curettage, placentectomy, salpingostomy, to give a lethal injection, or to offer methotrexate to terminate the pregnancy on the grounds that if the deaths remain truly "unintended" by the interior choice of the acting persons in the situation, then they are indirect and licit abortions. Every one of these procedures has something in common in its natural structure; it involves the immediate (not secondarily caused) destruction of human life. What needs to be noted, however, is that the NNL position is coherent within its own methodology: in each of these cases, the moral object is formed by the prior interior choice which is then projected onto the external behavior or physical action chosen. It is the internal choice which actually defines what the moral act itself is. This is the new method or philosophic lens which the NNL theory brings to the table.
The great danger here is that while the NNL theorists and their followers do genuinely mean to give a faithful interpretation of ecclesial teaching in Evangelium vitae and VS as I will demonstrate below, they do not approach the defining of moral species according to the ecclesial method of first identifying acts by their nature or natural structure-acts which then would be wrong to choose. By adopting a very different method of defining moral species in the first place, they have completely redefined what direct abortion means. Whereas traditionally in medical ethics, a direct action implies a causal relationship in which a physician's actions terminate on the body of the baby or, in the case of direct sterilization, on healthy organs, the NNL theory does not include the causal structure of human acts within their analysis of the moral object; they consciously and deliberately reject this perspective. Why? Because according to Grisez, "insofar as an action is considered according to its natural given structure, it is to that extent not considered as a human act-i.e. as a moral act." I have already demonstrated that this assertion is completely at odds with actual ecclesial teaching. Yet if one follows Grisez, one will arrive at the following conclusion: whether or not the action chosen immediately causes the death of the baby (e.g., salphingostomy) or secondarily causes it (e.g., salphingectomy) is morally irrelevant and thus excluded from the moral object. In fact, Steven Jensen has insightfully observed that the NNL theory has a certain "aversion for the word 'cause'" (Jensen 2014 ). On their account, "direct" means willfully "intended" against the good of human life, an interpretation which is certainly understandable according to the first part of ERD 45, but not according to the second part of the definition in which "the sole immediate effect" is the termination of a pregnancy. This latter part of the definition implies-and rightly so-that actions performed on the body of an unborn baby or on his or her vital organs, (e.g., trophoblast, placenta, etc.) are direct abortions and are thus always gravely evil.
The famous "Phoenix case" abortion at St. Joseph's Hospital a decade ago made this issue all the more poignant as Bishop Thomas Olmstead judged the abortion in the maternal-fetal conflict case to be direct and consequently revoked the hospital's Catholic status, 4 whereas the hospital ethicist Therese Lyslaught (2011) judged the action to be indirect and cited the scholarship not only of Rhonheimer but also of the NNL theory in support of her judgment. According to her analysis, the placentectomy abortion followed ERD 47 on treating a proportionately serious pathological condition, even if the death of the baby results as a foreseen but undesired effect. She also considered that they followed ERD 45 because in the conflict situation, the death of the baby was certainly unintended and considered a tragic loss by all involved. The TNL interpretation, by contrast, would take into account the actual medical procedure chosen as a part of specifying the moral object and argue that the patient and physician deliberately chose to perform an external behavior on a living human being that ought never to be chosen. The definition of direct abortion in ERD 45 as "the directly intended destruction of a viable fetus" in fact presumes the chosen medical procedure, because it is absurd to argue that the conscious decision to deliberately lacerate another human being to death is not a part of what the moral agent has chosen. The acting person does not live in the bubble of his own conscious mind. He is an acting person, one who acts upon the world in which the agency of his action (laceration) is per se ordered to the finality of another immediate effect (death). If a physician uses a curette to lacerate a living unborn child to death or to destroy his vital organs, it is a direct abortion, regardless of how a moral agent might think of his choice within the confines of his own mind and apart from "nature" and its "laws"-language that the Church uses in conjunction with its description of intrinsically evil acts. The freely chosen external act in its natural structure is sufficient to deem the choice intrinsically evil.
Despite what should have been a clear teaching on the formal distinction between direct and indirect abortion in Evangelium vitae and in the ERDs, the ambiguity and uncertainty of what is morally permissible have remained in recent scholarship. In the last few years, some scholars who initially sympathized with the NNL analysis of the moral object have later changed their minds and now oppose it on the grounds that it is too subjective (Berg 2017) , and some who initially opposed it are now sympathetic to their view on the grounds that it seems to follow the teaching of Pope John Paul II in VS (May 2013 ). Yet since both theories cannot be correct in their opposing judgments, and because this debate will continue to affect moral reasoning and critical decisions on current procedures and medications in medical ethics, I will demonstrate further that the novel view proceeds from an exegetical reading of the text of VS that is fundamentally unsound.
The Object of the Moral Act in VS no. 78
Pope John Paul II (1993) begins VS 78 stating that "the morality of the human act depends primarily and fundamentally on the 'object' rationally chosen by the deliberate will, as is born out by the insightful analysis, still valid today, made by Saint Thomas" (no. 78). In stating that the moral object is primary, he is reiterating that once the moral object is known to be evil, then one cannot licitly commit such an action even if it is for the most noble of intentions. As he states in number 78, "the reason why a good intention is not itself sufficient, but a correct choice of actions is also needed, is that the human act depends on its object, whether or not that object is capable or not of being ordered to God" (John Paul II 1993, no. 78) . Therefore, it is very important that one correctly grasp the elements that go into determining the moral object. John Paul II (1993) explains these elements in some detail.
In order to be able to grasp the object of an act which specifies that act morally, it is therefore necessary to place oneself in the perspective of the acting person. The object of the act of willing is in fact a freely chosen kind of behaviour. To the extent that it is in conformity with the order of reason, it is the cause of the goodness of the will; it perfects us morally, and disposes us to recognize our ultimate end in the perfect good, primordial love. By the object of a given moral act, then, one cannot mean a process or an event of the merely physical order, to be assessed on the basis of its ability to bring about a given state of affairs in the outside world. Rather, that object is the proximate end of a deliberate decision which determines the act of willing on the part of the acting person. (no. 78) According to the NNL analysis, John Paul II argues that the moral object is determined by placing oneself "in the perspective of the acting person" which they interpret as giving an "intelligible proposal" of the inner choice involved in a human act. They also believe that it is important to stress Pope John Paul II's statement that by the moral object, "one cannot mean a process or an event of the merely physical order" (John Paul II 1993, no. 78 ). This statement seems to confirm their view that the physical order only shares in and completes the prior interior choice. Furthermore, they read John Paul II's definitive statement on defining direct abortion in Evangelium vitae precisely through their own method, the subject's own conscious proposal. John Paul II (1993) defines direct abortion in Evangelium vitae as follows: "I declare that direct abortion, that is, abortion willed as an end or as a means, always constitutes a grave moral disorder, since it is the deliberate killing of an innocent human being" (no. 62). On their reading of Pope John Paul, direct means deliberately willed, so that the subject's interior choice and reason for acting are precisely to act against the good of human life, but the "means," on their account, is only defined by the agent's own subjective and conscious mind.
The prolific and renown moral theologian, May (2013) , in his final updated work on bioethics teaches, contrary to his earlier view, that this is the correct way to interpret Pope John Paul II. In speaking of the distinction between direct and indirect abortions, he rightly states the following cases as examples of direct abortion: killing an unborn baby "to avoid the embarrassment of out-of-wedlock pregnancy, [or] to prevent the birth of a child probably suffering from some genetically induced malady" (May 2013, 163) . He comments on the moral object of these examples by saying that "this 'object' is precisely the aborting or killing of unborn human life. The abortion (killing) of that life cannot not be willed by the acting person" (May 2013, 163) . His rationale is that the subject's clear intention is bringing about the death of the baby and that this willing by the acting person is the sole criterion which makes the action direct. May also gives a correct example of an indirect abortion, such as hysterectomy of a pregnant woman suffering from aggressive uterine cancer where there are no other alternatives. In this case, the object can be good, the death of the baby is both unintended and for the TNL view indirectly caused and thus the procedure can satisfy all of the conditions for the principle of double effect. But May's (2013) reasoning for their being indirect, however, is that neither the end intended nor the means chosen to attain the end in question is the abortion or killing of the unborn. This is foreseen as an inevitable and unavoidable result of the deed chosen to protect or heal or safeguard the mother's life, but it is not willed by the acting person. It is "outside the scope of his or her intentions" and can be justified if there is urgent need to protect a great good, such as the life of the mother, and no other alternatives can be used to do so. (p. 163) It is clear that May is sincerely attempting to do justice to John Paul II's thought on the acting person in VS no. 78 and his definition of direct abortion in Evangelium vitae 62. Yet May's rationale for an indirect abortion-what makes "the means chosen" indirect-however is that the agent's genuine intention specifying the moral object is not "killing" because killing is not the reason for acting. For May, the death of the baby is "outside the scope of his or her intentions." It is neither willed by the acting person nor forms a part of his or her reason for acting. Because they are truly unintentional, for May, they are neither the end nor means specifically chosen.
May is correct that an indirect abortion should not be intentional killing, but this analysis remains insufficient. There is no mention whatsoever in May's text that an integral part of the definition of direct or indirect is whether or not the actual medical procedure deliberately chosen immediately and physically causes the death of the child by the physician's actions terminating on the body of the baby. May gets the answers right but completely reinterprets Pope John Paul II's rationale according to the prior theoretical commitments of the NNL theory. For this reason, May (2013) comes to the following conclusion, much like Brugger and Grisez: I think that the distinction between abortion as "killing" and abortion as "removal" is a valid distinction, and is relevant to the issue of abortion when it is defined as the removal or expulsion of a nonviable fetus from the mother's body, and that if abortion is defined in this way, then some "direct" abortions are, at least in principle justifiable. It is obvious, however, that if "direct" abortion, i.e. abortion intended either as end or as chosen means is defined-as it is by Pope John Paul II-[in Evangelium vitae] as the "killing" of an innocent unborn person, then all "direct" abortions are gravely immoral and in no way justifiable. (pp. 190-91) May, like Rhonheimer, interprets Pope John Paul II's definition of direct abortion from Evangelium vitae by considering the agent's conscious willing or intending as the sole factor in determining what distinguishes direct versus "indirect" abortion: Does the physician conceive of his act as "removal" or does he conceive of his act formally as "killing"? The entire rationale depends on what takes place within the mind of the physician. May's commentary on the text of EV then logically implies that it can be morally licit and indirect to use drugs whose immediate effect is to expel a nonviable fetus from the womb or to perform a dilation and curettage on a living unborn child so long as the subject's intention in a conflict situation is not "killing" but merely "removal" for a life-saving reason that is proportionate and necessary. But if the motive itself is "killing," then and only then, is it direct and thus unjustifiable according to Pope John Paul II's definition. This subtle redefinition of terms is completely out of line with the Catholic moral tradition because it denies the inherent intelligibility of the external behavior, the procedure chosen, as integral for specifying the moral object-an error that John Paul II himself denounces within the very same chapter of VS, as I will demonstrate below.
Because of May's presuppositions in articulating the moral object, it is not surprising that once he has accepted the NNL interpretation of Pope John Paul II, he will come to very radical conclusions. In the next paragraph, he announces that he has now definitively changed his mind from opposing the gruesome craniotomy procedure to accepting it as morally licit on the grounds that "the intent in that case is to affect delivery, not to kill the child" (May 2013, 192). 5 Thus, for May, the physical actions of a doctor drilling a hole in an almost-born baby's skull, empting out his or her brain contents and forcibly collapsing the skull and delivering a dead baby, are not of themselves morally relevant to understanding the moral species of the act, because "the intent is to affect delivery, not to kill the child." This conclusion remains coherent within the NNL view on defining a moral species: it is the interior choice that defines the external act, not, as the TNL holds the external act itself (immediately crushing a baby to death) as an act with a natural structure that ought never to be chosen. May (2013) concludes his reasoning by reiterating that according to Pope John Paul II, a human act "cannot be identified with a process or an event of the physical order" (p. 192). Here, May actually misquotes John Paul II, who wrote in VS no. 78 that the moral object is "not merely" physical, not that it does not include the physical actions as a part of the deliberate choice-a rather egregious misquotation in such an important section of his book! Furthermore, May justifies his position by stating that "if viewed from the perspective of the acting person"-that familiar language of VS no. 78-one could see this procedure either as a morally evil partial-birth abortion if killing is what the subject intends or as an entirely morally licit choice where the death of the baby is an unintended "side effect." 6 This subjective rationale cutoff from the natural implications of the causality of physical acts is deeply disturbing, both morally and philosophically, since it subtly redefines direct and indirect abortions to a meaning, which I will argue that Pope John Paul II and the prior magisterial tradition have never nor could ever accept. Clarity in defining direct and indirect is critical because intellectual error on a matter of such importance has led to, and will continue to lead to, the permission of significant moral evil in Catholic health care.
If we return to Pope John Paul II's statement in VS no. 78, it is clear that Pope John Paul II did not intend to propose a wholly novel way of understanding the object of the moral act, since he cites the traditional view of Aquinas, rather than suggesting he is establishing something new. When John Paul II states that a right understanding of the moral object requires that one "place oneself in the perspective of the acting person," he immediately explains very precisely what he means by this phrase: "the object of the act of willing is in fact a freely chosen kind of behavior." According to John Paul II's explanation a moral act must be (1) a freely chosen act, and (2) it must be a "kind of behavior" with a certain nature that the actor chooses to perform. It is a "kind of behavior" that is chosen, not an interior choice that entirely determines what the behavior is. It is not the interior choice projected onto a merely physical action, but the acting person who in his own interior freedom deliberately chooses to engage in a specific type of behavior. Specifying a moral object for all classes of acts must at least first begin with what the action is in its natural structure. In fact, in this very paragraph no. 78, he reminds his readers to be wary of the error of proportionalism whose key problem is the very same error as Grisez: reducing the moral meaning of nature to what is "merely physical!" When Pope John Paul II states that the object of a moral act is not "merely [of the] physical order," he is not stating that all arguments based on nature are merely physiological, nor is he arguing that what belongs to an action physically is not included within the moral evaluation; quite the contrary! Rather, he is first reiterating what defines a moral object by recalling his response to the "physicalist" objection in VS no. 47. Those who make the charge of physicalism against the Church's teaching on natural law commit the error of reducing the order of nature to what is merely "biological." He states,
In this context, objections of physicalism and naturalism have been level against the traditional conception of the natural law, which is accused of presenting as moral law what are in themselves biological laws. . . . According to certain theologians, this kind of "biologistic" or naturalistic argumentation" would even be present in certain documents of the Church's Magisterium, particularly those dealing with the area of sexual and conjugal ethics. . . . In their view, man, as a rational being, not only can but actually must determine the meaning of his behaviour. (John Paul II 1993, no. 47) The Pope has in mind in particular those theologians who have formally dissented from the Church's teachings on the grounds that nature itself is merely "physical" and that moral acts must transcend nature and be the result of man determining the meaning of his own actions and external behaviors. These dissenting theologians argue in favor of contraception, homosexual acts, and so on. While Grisez is most certainly not a dissenter by any means and adamantly rejects those conclusions, his own philosophical method, as I demonstrated above in fact shares these very same underlying features with them. Like these dissenters, Grisez thought it "futile" to define a moral act of an intrinsically evil kind by its natural structure, precisely because he conflated the natural order as merely "physiological." Grisez in fact argues in favor of the very position that Pope John Paul II condemns here, namely that "man as a rational being, not only can but must determine the meaning of his behaviour."
This fact is even more clear in no. 48 when Pope John Paul II explains the role of the human body within natural law. He states, A freedom which claims to be absolute ends up treating the human body as a raw datum, devoid of any meaning and moral values until freedom has shaped it in accordance with its design. Consequently, human nature and the body appear as presuppositions or preambles, materially necessary for freedom to make its choice, yet extrinsic to the person, the subject and the human act. Their functions would not be able to constitute reference points for moral decisions, because the finalities of these inclinations would be merely "physical" goods, called by some "pre-moral". To refer to them, in order to find in them rational indications with regard to the order of morality, would be to expose oneself to the accusation of physicalism or biologism. (Pope John Paul II, 1993, no. 48 ).
While Grisez never argues in favor of an "absolute" freedom, since he defends moral absolutes by means of his theory of basic goods, he nevertheless views human nature and the body precisely as "presuppositions or preambles, materially necessary for freedom to make its choice, yet extrinsic to . . . the human act." This aspect of his thought concerns the entire debate about direct and indirect abortion. Yet Pope John Paul II is critical of theologians who fail to see moral meaning in "the finalities of these inclinations" by calling them "merely physical" in the first place. Yet, this precise error is exactly the error that NNL theologians continue to make! In the example of contraception, both Grisez and proportionalist thinkers did not see any moral meaning in the "natural structure" of the conjugal act; they explicitly failed to perceive the moral meaning in "the finality of these inclinations" i.e. in the agency of sex as ordered to procreation, which as we have seen was the critical moral difference according to Humanae vitae. The NNL theologians view nature with all of its physicality as essentially "pre-moral," even if they do not use this exact phrase themselves. David Crawford marvelously summarizes the heart of the issue:
The fundamental mistake of proportionalism is not first its weighing of "pre-moral" values and disvalues, it is rather its reduction of the action itself, including its physical structure, to a merely "premoral" event or happening. It is only this latter mistake that renders the weighing of values and disvalues pernicious, because it is only this reduction that allows the weighing to claim precedence over negative absolutes. In other words, the more fundamental mistake is not the weighing of "premoral" acts and events, but the reduction of those acts and events to the merely "premoral" in the first place. (Crawford, 2010, 281) .
Pope John Paul II's main critique against proportionalism is not even first its problematic weighing; but its prior reduction of the moral meaning of nature to what is "merely physical." It is this precise error that he recalls in VS no. 78, when he argues that the moral object is not "merely physical." He's reminding them that it is already a moral act, and failing to see that by calling it "merely physical" is in fact, the error of physicalism! When NNL theologians quote this line as giving credence to their view that the physical aspects of a procedure need not be included in the moral object, they are not only misinterpreting John Paul II; they are actually arguing in favor of a position that Pope John Paul II is explicitly condemning in that very sentence. These theologians reduce the natural structure of an act already imbued with moral meaning to something "pre-moral," or "merely physical" in the first place. Suggesting that lacerating a baby to death is "merely physical" is exactly the kind of reduction that John Paul II judges to be seriously problematic, just as proportionalists reduced contraception to a "merely physical" act that required further evaluation to make a moral judgment.
Secondly, Pope John Paul II is very clear in VS no. 78 that to define a moral object, it is necessary to determine what this act is about by appealing to "the order of reason." Here is another key issue. For Pope John Paul II and the Catholic tradition as a whole, the "order of reason" is measured by the speculative order of ends discoverable within nature as a participation in the eternal law. John Paul II makes this point explicitly clear in the same chapter of VS in nos. 40-45. He states, "reason draws its own truth and authority from the eternal law, which is none other than the divine wisdom itself" (John Paul II 1993, no. 40) . The "order of reason" mentioned in paragraph 78 is alluding to human reason as John Paul II has just explicitly defined it, as a participation in the eternal law or divine wisdom itself. He states further in that section that Others [theologians] speak, and rightly so, of theonomy or participated theonomy, since man's free obedience to God's law effectively implies that human reason and human will participate in God's wisdom and providence. By forbidding man to "eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil," God makes it clear that man does not originally possess such knowledge as something properly his own, but only participates in it by the light of natural reason and of Divine Revelation, which manifest to him the requirements and the promptings of eternal wisdom. Law must therefore be considered an expression of divine wisdom: by submitting to the law, freedom submits to the truth of creation. (John Paul II 1993, no. 41) According to Pope John Paul II, human reason can come to the knowledge of good and evil by reflecting on the order of nature (not merely physical processes) as the imprint of God's own wisdom; this order is the eternal law. Human reason freely participates within that very order of divine providence, and therefore the natural law is nothing other than man's rational "participation in the eternal law" citing Aquinas in paragraph 43. The intelligibility of acts in their natural structure therefore must be included within the moral species because for John Paul II, human reason does not "institute" morality as Grisez holds; rather, human reason can only judge what is good and evil, by first recognizing and submitting to "the truth of creation," that is, the order of nature in all of its speculative intelligibility. In fact, Aquinas himself, whom John Paul II quotes in this section, holds that recognition of the speculative order of being is essential "for human conduct" because man's own reason is not the measure but must first be measured by the wise ordering of nature; right reason for the moral life operates well only when it first receives "the principles impressed on it by nature" (Aquinas, 1925, ST I-II, q. 91, a. 3, ad. 2) .
7 It is clear for Pope John Paul II that the "order of reason" is rooted within the natural teleology inscribed into creation as the expression of divine providence. It is this key foundational principle that Pope John Paul II insists upon so that moral theologians will not fall into various errors in moral reasoning. In fact, all of the moral errors he critiques in chapter 2 of VS are rooted in a common failure to understand properly this foundational point.
A proper exegesis of a text does not permit one to exclude the foundational principles upon which a teaching is based and to reinterpret the teaching without them. Yet this move is precisely what the broader NNL project does and has consciously taught since its inception (Grisez 1970; Finnis 1998) . While striving to uphold an objective morality in a postmodern world that rejects metaphysics, NNL thinkers nobly attempt to provide a rationale for moral absolutes, yet without appealing to the eternal law or to a philosophy of nature. They propose more narrowly instead that there are certain basic goods and values whereby one can derive objective moral standards. On their view, while it may not be wrong to physically cause damage or destruction, it is always morally wrong to intentionally damage a "basic good" such as the good of life itself. They have shifted the very foundation for moral reasoning from the order of nature to the conscious thinking subject and the harms he either intends or does not intend to do.
Yet this change at the foundation departs from how the Church herself has always understood the natural law-as man's rational participation in the eternal law established by God (John Paul II 1993, no. 40-44) . Because the NNL theory consciously and deliberately restricts its focus to practical reasoning and "basic goods" apart from their speculative foundations, it has in fact departed from the very foundation upon which the Church's own moral teaching stands. They have departed from the foundational teaching that Pope John Paul II was at pains to explain in Veritatis splendor in response to the various moral errors among academic theologians. This historical and philosophical fact is the root reason for all of the confusion and contradictory conclusions regarding the meaning of direct and indirect abortions. In his critique of the broader NNL theory, Russell Hittinger argues that "the problem lies in a failure to interrelate systematically practical reason with a philosophy of nature" (Hittinger 1987, 165-93) . To begin moral reasoning on an entirely different foundation necessarily leads to fundamentally different conclusions. If one puts on glasses with pink lenses that he himself has made, he will see everything in pink. The NNL method interprets Pope John Paul II's "the perspective of the acting person" through their own method of the discovering the agent's intentionality toward basic human goods. Pope John Paul II, however, does not share the same approach either in how to define a moral species or in the meaning of "nature" and its relationship to morality. Rather, he cautions that academic theologians are committing a serious moral error in reducing the order of nature to something "merely physical" in the first place. Whereas the NNL shares the physicalist understanding of nature, by contrast, Pope John Paul II renounces this view in the very same chapter of VS and insists instead that moral theologians recognize and submit to the full "truth of creation" rooted in the eternal law.
Furthermore, not only do these thinkers misinterpret his understanding of nature, but also his understanding of subjectivity. Any serious reader of Pope John Paul II's lifework must come to terms with the fact that he was very seriously interested in the "subjectivity" and "consciousness" of the acting person. 8 Man is a person who not only chooses certain behaviors, but also experiences his own actions as an individual actor. The person is in a certain sense irreducible (Wojtyla 2008 ). Yet Wojtyla's focus on the "subjectivity" of the acting person serves not only to provide a more complete account of the human person than what he found in Thomism, and so to provide a new "Thomsitic personalism," but also and explicitly to provide a corrective to secular Cartesianism, which values the subjective aspect of the human person to the exclusion of the objective teleological order. As a philosopher and phenomenologist, John Paul II spent his entire career exploring the "subjective" aspect of man precisely in order to counter Cartesianism. He never dreamed that his phrase, "the perspective of the acting person" would be taken to mean valuing the subjective to the exclusion of the objective order of nature, because his entire life work on subjectivity itself was aimed at correcting those who make these very errors! John Paul II's own focus on subjectivity itself could never lead logically to the conclusions of the NNL theory. While it is not my purpose here to judge the merits and shortcomings of the broader NNL theory of "incommensurable basic goods," for upholding moral absolutes in civic discourse in a post-Christian world, it is nevertheless critical to see that this theory is absolutely speaking not the teaching of Pope John Paul II because it departs from his teaching at the foundation. It is therefore a hermeneutical mistake to impose one's own philosophical method on a text, a method not shared by the author, and then conclude that one is correctly interpreting that thinker.
In chapter 2 of VS, Pope John Paul II explicitly affirms the full metaphysical and theonomic character of the natural law. The novel interpretation of the document on the moral object is fundamentally at odds with John Paul II's own thought in that very document, since it deliberately does not accept the foundations upon which John Paul II's own teaching and the Church's moral tradition are based. In fact, to reject the prior speculative wisdom as the ground of moral reasoning is to separate oneself not only from the mind of Pope John Paul II but also from St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, and the Second Vatican Council-all of whom are cited within the same paragraph of VS (John Paul II 1993, no. 41-43) . The breach at the foundation, then, gives rise to fundamentally different conclusions on the moral importance of what is immediately caused by one's physical action. The NNL dismisses the physical actions that an agent consciously and deliberately chooses as "merely physical," and not a part of the subject's intentionality against a basic good, and therefore not a part of the specified moral object. In quoting Pope John Paul II's words, they genuinely believe that they have offered a correct interpretation of his thought, but the method through which they read his words is a lens fundamentally at odds with his explicit teaching in the very same document and chapter. They commit the very error that Pope John Paul II was at pains to illumine! How ironic that by using his own words, they continue to propagate the very error-reducing what is moral to the merely physical-that he himself found so serious and debilitating for Catholic moral theology.
Pope John Paul II himself would, in fact, reject this voluntarist interpretation of "the perspective of the acting person," for it is the same Pope who argues in the same encyclical, with emphasis in the original text, "A doctrine which dissociates the moral act from the bodily dimensions of its exercise is contrary to the teaching of Scripture and Tradition" (John Paul II 1993, no. 49) . How could it not be! To suppose that one could dissociate the two presupposes an entirely different philosophical view, one deeply at odds with the Catholic moral tradition. Furthermore, the Pope observes that:
Such a doctrine revives, in new forms, certain ancient errors which have always been opposed by the Church, inasmuch as they reduce the human person to a "spiritual" and purely formal freedom. . . . This reduction misunderstands the moral meaning of the body and of kinds of behaviour involving it. In fact, body and soul are inseparable: in the person, in the willing agent and in the deliberate act, they stand or fall together. (John Paul II 1993, no. 49, emphasis mine) Not only does Pope John Paul II identify a kind of neo-Gnosticism inherent in this view, but he deliberately connects the philosophical anthropology of the human person as a soul-body unity to the person as a moral agent because speculative truth grounds the practical moral life. For this reason, "in the deliberate act," that is, in the moral act, soul and body "stand or fall together."
The Order of Nature: The Foundation for Medical Ethics "Medical ethics should be based upon being and nature" (Pius XII 1952) . These are the words of Pope Pius XII which echo hundreds of years of speculative contemplation on the morality of human acts. When asked about the moral limits of research into new medical procedures and methods, Pope Pius XII (1952) declared, The limit [for the doctor] is the same as that for the patient. It is that which is fixed by the judgment of sound reason, which is set by the demands of the natural moral law, which is deduced from the natural teleology inscribed in beings and from the scale of values expressed by the nature of things. (no. 18) Ecclesial teaching recognizes that the foundation for moral reasoning must be grounded in the "the natural teleology inscribed in beings" as distinct from a moral agent's intentionality toward basic goods and values. Note that Pius XII does not argue that so long as researchers have formulated an "intelligible proposal" based on sincere intentions, they may attempt various medical procedures without regard for what they physically cause for the patient. Sound moral reasoning in the ecclesial tradition must first recognize speculative truth about the natural world in order to make practical judgments about what is good and evil. The "nature" of procedures, their real causality, and immediate effects must enter the "judgment of sound reason" because the foundation for this very reasoning is the objective intelligible world in which human beings live, move, and act. Man cannot subjectively divorce himself from the natural world with its inner intelligibility "inscribed in beings" and attempt to make adequate moral judgments. If he does make judgments in this fashion, he cannot then be claiming to represent the Catholic moral tradition.
A final difficulty with the NNL analysis of the direct/indirect distinction is that it fails to make sense of the key term "therapeutic" in medical ethics. For example, in HV, Pope Paul VI distinguishes the moral evil of direct sterilization from licit indirect sterilizations by use of this term.
On the other hand, the Church does not consider at all illicit the use of those therapeutic means necessary to cure bodily diseases, even if a foreseeable impediment to procreation should result there from-provided such impediment is not directly intended for any motive whatsoever. (Paul VI 1968, no. 15) In this text, Pope Paul VI notes that a medical treatment that is "therapeutic" is not contraceptive, even if as a result a person may be either temporarily or permanently sterile. Why is such a procedure not "at all" illicit? It is licit not only because in the procedure the patient and doctors do not intend their act to be contraceptive but also because in the real order, the causality of the treatment is immediately directed toward an organ with a real pathology-that is precisely what makes the treatment "therapeutic" and not a mutilation of a healthy organ. Something within the order of nature is now "out of order" and in need of healing. The causality of the surgeon's action is ordered to correcting the pathology, and the action may have a foreseeable secondary effect of rendering a patient sterile either temporarily or permanently. By contrast, the removal of a woman's reproductive organs when there is no illness or injury is a direct sterilization because the causality of the medical act immediately terminates on healthy organs; it is for this reason that it is fair to say that the woman intends this act to be contraceptive. She cannot intend it to be therapeutic because in the real order, her body is not in need of therapy. It is the awareness and acceptance of the natural teleology "inscribed in beings" that is at the foundation for Paul VI's judgment. It is the same foundation that one finds in both Pope Pius XII and Pope John Paul II.
Note that in the final clause, Pope Paul VI states that a therapeutic sterilizing act is indirect and licit "provided such impediment is not directly intended for any motive whatsoever." Here, however, he cautions that even if a man were undergoing a properly therapeutic and therefore licit procedure, if it were the case that interiorly he rejoiced at his sterility because he could no longer beget children, he would in fact be guilty of sin. Part of his own "motive" or intention would be selfish, perhaps in a way similar to a couple practicing NFP for selfish reasons. Yet in both cases, the type of act remains licit, that is, the moral object is good, but the motive or intention impure. The Catholic analysis cares deeply for what is interior in the soul of man-indeed, it is his heart that Christ has come to redeem-yet his interiority has never been, nor could it ever be, the sole criterion for specifying the moral object.
Conclusion
While the Christian faithful owe a tremendous debt to Germain Grisez and William May for their lifework and prolific scholarship in moral theology, it remains necessary to bring to light this particular error on direct and indirect abortions. Because they use same language as John Paul II in VS and Evangelium vitae to defend the primacy of the moral object and the injustice of direct killing of the innocent, the subtle redefinition of direct and indirect is much more difficult to identify; it has caused and will continue to cause confusion on implementing the ERDs in situations of conflict. Unfortunately, their rationale actually allows for the direct killing of the innocent and thus the permission of intrinsically evil acts-the very type of acts that Pope John Paul II was, in fact, at pains to condemn in VS.
9 If I may be so bold as to adopt Janet Smith's words as my own: "their analysis, especially in its terminology, in many ways resembles traditional modes of analysis;
[yet] these resemblances can mislead the reader into thinking that their analysis is more aligned with the tradition than, in fact, it is" (Smith 1991, 353) .
A proper understanding of direct and indirect must include the real physical causality that the moral agent deliberately chooses because it is a part of the natural structure of the external act, which itself is already imbued with moral meaning. Man is an acting person. He moves within and acts upon a created and speculatively intelligible world. He is not free to consider the moral object within the confines of his own mind and apart from the realities of the objective world, nor can he reduce the moral meaning of nature to what is "merely physical." In identifying the moral object, ethicists must ask the question, "what does this medical procedure cause and do the physician's actions terminate on the body of another or on his healthy organs? Is it caused directly or indirectly?" The acting person is morally responsible for what he immediately causes. At root, the authentic Catholic moral tradition must always consider "the truth of creation" and "the natural teleology inscribed in beings" to be not only relevant but foundational to medical ethics; in recognizing this foundation, one must not make the mistake of conflating the order of nature with mere physiology, thereby finding the only possible locus for morality to be in the interiority of the individual actor. In the words of Pope John Paul II (1998) himself in Fides et ratio:
We face a great challenge at the end of this millennium to move from phenomenon to foundation, a step as necessary as it is urgent. We cannot stop short at experience alone; even if experience does reveal the human being's interiority and spirituality, speculative thinking must penetrate to the spiritual core and the ground from which it rises. Therefore, a philosophy which shuns metaphysics would be radically unsuited to the task of mediation in the understanding of Revelation. (no. 83) The NNL analysis of the moral object and of direct and indirect abortion deliberately stops short at the interiority and experience of the acting person and fails to move to the true metaphysical foundation for moral reasoning, contrary to the Pope's own thought. Consequently, these scholars consciously reject the requisite philosophical foundation for understanding the revelation handed on in VS and Evangelium vitae. According to Pope John Paul II himself, "we cannot" take such a limited approach, especially since it affects, more than anything, human behavior and moral choices.
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In absolutely no sector of human life does man get to decide that he is only responsible for one narrowly defined aspect of his choice which he interiorly deems to be good, while he simultaneously abdicates responsibility for what the remainder of his choice, caused physically by his own hands, actually entails. Rather, to grow in holiness demands that man recognize and accept with humility the full reality of the choices before him, with all of their difficulties, and to remain steadfast in virtuous living, even if it entails great sacrifice. For this very reason, Pope John Paul II (1993) does not end VS with chapter 2 but proceeds to a third and final chapter on the true power of Christ's cross and the call to martyrdom in the concrete situations of daily moral living: "Only in the mystery of Christ's Redemption do we discover the 'concrete' possibilities of man. . . . This is what is at stake: the reality of Christ's redemption" (no. 103). It is not for man to redefine reality by the intentionality of his own mind, but to be redeemed by it, through the situations God's providence permits, through the power of the cross of Jesus Christ.
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Notes
1. Note that these authors have not commented on this precise situation, but I am applying their method of analysis for a craniotomy to this scenario which presents a similar conflict situation, not between mother and baby but between two babies. 2. Boyle speaks of the craniotomy procedure in a situation of maternal/fetal vital conflict: "[It]t is not the killing which removes the threat; the means here appears to be the craniotomy itself insofar as it alters the dimensions of the skull in order to allow labor to proceed. It is the dimensions of the baby's skull being altered and not its being dead which saves the mother's life." May cites this rationale in his book for why he now supports the New Natural Law (NNL) theory (see
